EMPLOYER AND

EMPLOYEE-

TION-VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE

EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINA-

ACTION PROGRAMS NOT PRO-

HIBITED BY TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964-

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
On February 1, 1974, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation (Kaiser)' entered into a labor agreement with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (USWA). 2 In addition to providing
for hourly wages and conditions of employment, the agreement called
for the establishment of an on-the-job training program based on
race. 3 Through the use of dual seniority lists drawn according to
race, the agreement provided for a minimum fifty percent minority
4
representation in this training program.
1 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2725 (1979). Kaiser is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in California. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D.La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1917), rev'd
sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). It is the third largest producer
of aluminum in the United States. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1979, Sec. D. 1.
2 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725. The USWA is a labor organization
which represents both skilled and unskilled employees at all Kaiser plants covered by the 1974
agreement. Brief for Petitioner at 3, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner]. Its function is to exert influence upon management in

favor of its members during labor negotiations. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
415 F. Supp. at 763.
' United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725. Prior to the 1974 agreement, Kaiser
obtained most of its skilled employees from outside the plant. Id. In response to pressure from
the USWA to open craft positions to union members already working for the company, Kaiser,
prior to 1974, instituted a training program under which an unskilled employee with partial
craft experience would be provided with the training that they did not already have. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 9, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Fifth Circuit Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees]. By 1975 Kaiser employed
292 skilled workers, twenty-eight of whom had obtained this status through the partial experience training program. Id. By 1974, however, only five blacks were employed as craftsmen.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
4 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725. The controversial part of the 1974
agreement was as follows:
"It is further agreed that the Joint Committee will specifically review the minority
representation in the existing Trade, Craft, and Assigned Maintenance classifications, in the plants set forth below, and, where necessary, establish certain goals
and time tables in order to achieve a desired minority ratio:"
[Gramercy Works listed, among others]
"As apprentice and craft jobs are to be filled, the contractual selection criteria shall
be applied in reaching such goals; at a minimum, not less than one minority
employee will enter for every non-minority employee entering until the goal is
reached unless at a particular time there are insufficient available qualified minority
candidates ...."
Id. at 2738 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting from 1974 agreement).
According to the terms of the agreement, the joint implementation committee determined
that the desired goal for minority craft representation at the Gramercy plant would be 39%. Id.
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Brian Weber, an unskilled employee at the Kaiser plant located
in Gramercy, Louisiana, 5 applied for the training program openings
which became available in April of 1974.6 Consistent with the
scheme established under the agreement, Weber's application wasdenied while minority employees with less plant seniority were accepted.7 After exhausting alternative remedies outside the courts,8
Weber brought a class action in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana against Kaiser and the USWA on
behalf of himself and all other white union-member employees at the
Gramercy plant who became eligible on February 1, 1974, for participation in the on-the-job training program. 9 Alleging that the prefThis figure was based on the percentage of minority workers in the surrounding area. Id. Kaiser
estimated that in order to achieve the desired ratio at the Gramercy plant, the racially based
training program would have to exist for at least 30 years. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at
52-53 n. 135.
5 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725. Weber was hired by Kaiser in approximately 1968 and throughout the case was employed as a laboratory analyst. N.Y. Times, Feb.
25, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 38. As a union member he was active in labor negotiations and, by
the time of trial, he had become chairman of the plant grievance committee. Weber v. Kaiser

Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 763.
6 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2738 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The openings available in April, 1974, were for the positions of instrument repairman, electrician, and
general repairman. Brief for Respondents at 5, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721
(1979). [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents]. Five blacks and four whites were selected to
be trained for these positions. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2738 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Later in 1974, Kaiser offered four more training positions for which two white and
two black employees were selected. Id. at 2738 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The opportunity afforded- unskilled employees by these training programs was significant.
Brief for Respondents, supra, at 6. Skilled workers earn approximately $20,000 per year and
have the opportunity to work overtime if they so desire. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, § 6
(Magazine), at 38. Additionally, skilled workers invariably work the day shift. Id. Weber, as an
average unskilled worker, earned about $18,000 per year, had less overtime opportunity, and
had to take a regular turn on the night shift. Id.
7 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725; Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at
5. Aside from the use of the racial criteria imposed by the 1974 agreement, seniority was the
only other factor which determined acceptance into the program. Id. at 4. Acceptance was on a
one to one racial basis with the most senior applicant in each racial group being chosen. Id. at
5. Of the seven blacks admitted into the program in 1974, two had less seniority than Weber.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 100. Being active in union affairs, Weber was
aware that the racial criteria had been included in the 1974 agreement. Id. He assumed that the
provision was included " 'to keep the Government happy.' "Id. When the dual seniority lists
were established he decided to test the company by bidding for the April 1974 openings. Id.
8 N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, § 6 (Magazine) at 100-01. Weber's first step was to file a
grievance with the USWA. Id. When this was denied he lodged a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in New Orleans. Id. When the Commission did not act
on the complaint he was informed that he had the right to institute a private action. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(1976).

' Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 763. The 1974 agreement
covered fifteen Kaiser plants throughout the country. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct.
at 2725. Weber's complaint dealt only with the application of the training program to the Gram-
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erential treatment for minority unskilled employees with less seniority constituted a quota system which violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,10 Weber sought injunctive relief against further
implementation of the training program by Kaiser.' 1
In granting Weber's request for a permanent injunction, 2 the
district court held that the quota system created under the 1974
agreement was a violation of sections 703(a) and 703(d) of Title VII
under two different rationales. -13 First, the court determined that
Title VII unequivocally prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any employee on a racial basis, 14 but that federal courts are
not subject to the same restrictions and may establish quota remedies
where appropriate.1 5 Secondly, quotas should only be imposed when
the employer has been found guilty of actual discrimination, which

ercy plant and the trial court considered the training program only as it was implemented there.
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 763.
10 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725-26. The applicable sections of Title VII
are sections 703(a) and (d), which provide that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2 000e-2(a), (d)(1976).
Weber also claimed a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at
46 n.185. Neither the district court nor the Fifth Circuit considered that claim and Weber
conceded that reliance on section 1981 was unnecessary. Id.
11 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 762-63. Weber originally
requested a preliminary injunction but the trial was conducted as if he had sought a permanent
injunction pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Id. at 763.
12 Id. at 770.
13 Id. at 766-67; see note 10 supra.
"' Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 766. The court stated that
Congress was aware of affirmative action programs when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was being
debated and did not exempt those programs from the clear prohibition against granting preferential treatment based on race. Id.
15 Id. at 767. The court held that sections 703(a) and 703(d) are directed only at employers.
Id. Furthermore, the court noted that because quotas are such extreme remedies, federal courts
alone are able to ascertain the necessity and duration of such a remedy. Id. at 768.
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Kaiser had not, 16 and then only in favor of those who have actually
17
been discriminated against.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the first rationale, 18 but
affirmed the district court's decision under the second. 1 9 Although
voluntary compliance was found to be a major objective of Title VII, 2 0
actual past employment discrimination must be present to make a
racial quota lawful. 2 ' Since Kaiser had never discriminated against
22
its minority employees, the racial preference violated Title VII.
The court also held that the quota could not be made valid under
Executive Order 11,246, which requires government contractors to
take affirmative action to avoid racial discrimination. 2 3 Being a government contractor, Kaiser was subject to the regulations promulgated under the Executive Order which compel the contractor to set
goals for hiring and promotion to overcome any underutilization of
racial minorities.2 4 The court concluded, however, that this mandate
for affirmative action could not be upheld over the direct congressional prohibition of racial discrimination in Title VII. 2z The Fifth
Circuit denied rehearing, 2 6 and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the petitions of Kaiser, the USWA, and the
United States. 2 7 On June 27, 1979, in a five to two decision, in
16 Id. at 764, 769. The court found that since the Gramercy plant opened in 1958, Kaiser
had never discriminated in its hiring practices. Id. at 764. At approximately the time that
Weber was hired, Kaiser began hiring unskilled employees at the gate on a one to one racial
basis in an effort to increase minority representation in the work force at the Gramercy plant. Id.
With regard to skilled positions, Kaiser had made extensive attempts to recruit black craftsmen
through such devices as advertising in black newspapers. Id.
17 Id. at 768. The court found that black employees at the Gramercy plant had not been
discriminated against by any employment practices of Kaiser. Id. at 764, 769.
'" Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
19 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 224.
20 Id. at 223. The court stated that "the central theme of Title VII" is the elimination of
discrimination through private settlement. Id.
21 Id. at 224. Judge Wisdom, in dissent, argued that the majority's holding would force
employers who desired to implement affirmative action to predict precisely what a federal court
would do under the particular circumstances of their case, or else be liable for reverse discrimination. Id. at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 224-26. Kaiser had argued that the training program should be validated as a
remedy for the past societal discrimination endured by its minority employees. Id. at 225. In
response to this the court stated that, although societal discrimination may have adversely affected the minority unskilled employees at the Gramercy plant, it had not affected their seniority there. Id. at 225-26.
23 Id. at 227; Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, reprinted following 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
24 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 222; 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.30
(1978).
25 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 227.
26 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 571 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
27 99 S. Ct. 608 (1979).
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United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Supreme Court reversed and held
that the voluntary affirmative action plan embodied in the Kaiser28
USWA agreement was not prohibited by Title VII.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 29 is "one of the most
important pieces of legislation of our time." 30 The primary reason
for the need for federal legislation in this area was, of course, the
31
harsh reality of employment discrimination against black Americans.
Title VII's effectiveness in providing impetus for minority employ32
ment was, however, limited by the principle of color blindness.
While the eighty-eighth Congress may perhaps be criticized for imposing a color blind constraint on legislation designed to open
employment opportunities to those who had been excluded from "the
main stream of American life," 33 it is doubtful whether a bill drawn
in explicit racial terms would have been passed. During the congressional debate over the merits of the Act, one commentator noted that
"it is being argued in a nervous Congress that the need for civil rights
legislation is not to advance the Negro cause, but to control and con34
tain it."
The bill which eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was introduced in the House on June 20, 1963, and immediately re-

28 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2725 (1979).

42 U.S.C. § 2000-e to -e17 (1976).
30 110 CONG. REC. 15832 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. (remarks of Sen. Javits).
One congressman stated that Title VII would do "more to eventually win the hearts and minds
of all Americans for the broad principle of equality of citizenship that is inherent in this civil
rights bill" than any other title. Id. at 15876 (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt).
31 See id. at 6547-48 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7204 (remarks of Sen. Clark); id. at
6552 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority And Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach To Objective Criteria Of Hiring And Promotion, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1598-99 (1969); Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
CoM. L. REV. 431, 431-32 (1966); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability
Tests in Employment and Education, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (1968); Developments in
the Law, Emptoyment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAIv. L.
REV. 1109, 1111, 1113-14 (1971).
32 See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1114-15. The Act itself states that an
employer not discriminate "because of race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (1976); see Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) ("the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an
equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race ... "),Id. at 579 (emphasis in original).
33 110 CONG. REC. 13080 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Clark); see Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage
and Comments, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 459 (1966). Professor Schmidt argues that to
attempt to secure equal employment opportunity in color blind terms "is equivalent to treating
a cancer with aspirin because you also happen to have a headache, a sore toe, and a hangnail!"
Id. at 460. But see Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1116.
34 Ashmore, The Desegregation Decision: Ten Years After, Saturday Review, May 16, 1964,
at 69.
29
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ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 35 It was reported back to
the House on November 20, 1963, and was passed after brief debate
on February 10, 1964, by a vote of 290-130.36 The bill was subsequently sent to the Senate and on March 9, 1964, Senator Mansfield
moved that it be debated on the merits immediately without the benefit of committee. 37 The motion was passed on March 26, 1964,
38
and the Senate began debate on the merits of the bill.
The Senate debate lasted eighty-three days. 39 Since the bill was
not referred to Senate committee, the legislative history of Title VII
is mainly composed of the virtually countless arguments that appear
in the Congressional Record. 40 While it is certainly questionable
whether these arguments and statements are the most accurate form
of legislative history, they are the principal source from which the
41
intent of Congress may be discerned.
There can be no doubt that certain legislators believed that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 "would make the members of a particular
race special favorites of the law," 4 2 and that the -United States "may
be governed and run for the benefit of minority groups." 4 3 Especially prevalent was fear that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission would impose racial quotas on employers.A4 Proponents
"

Vass, supra note 31, at 434.
REC. 15865 (1964).

36 110 CONG.

37 Vass, supra note 31, at 444.
38 110 CONG. REc. 6417 (1964). After the Mansfield motion was passed, Senator Morse of
Oregon immediately moved to refer the bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. In support
of his motion Senator Morse stated that "this is an instance in which the committee owes a clear
duty to the American people and the courts, in connection with the litigation that will be
instituted for the next 10 years if the bill is passed," id. at 6417-18, and Senator Lausche
admonished that "disregard for orderly procedure will come back to haunt us . . . because of
the many ramifications and the novel provisions contained in the bill." Id. at 6419. The Morse
motion was subsequently defeated. Vass, supra note 31, at 444.
as Vass, supra note 31, at 445. Actual debate on the merits lasted sixty-six days. Id. The
other 17 days were consumed by the procedural arguments concerning whether the bill should
be sent to committee. Id. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
40 Vass, supra note 31, at 444. When Senator Morse was arguing his motion he stated that
"[t]he thesis of my remarks is that we are hot giving the courts the best evidence as to congressional intent. It is that simple." 110 CONG. REG. 6421 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Morse). He also
cited a list of United States Supreme Court cases, all of which contained some variation of the
general thought that the debates on the floor of Congress indicate the feelings of individual
legislators and are not accurate indications of legislative intent. Id. at 6423-25.
41 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 31, at 1609; Vass, supra note 31, at 444. "Although the
Morse motion was defeated, the reasons for its proposal left their mark on the subsequent
handling of the bill." Id.
42 110 CONG. REC. 13079 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Ervin). See id. at 13077. Senator Dirksen
stated that "[t]he bill would remake the social pattern of this country." Id. at 6445.
41 Id. at 15878 (remarks of Rep. Sikes).
44 Id. at 2557 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id. at 4764 (remarks of Sen. Ervin and Sen. Hill);
id. at 5092 (remarks of Sen. Robertson); id. at 8500 (remarks of Sen. Smathers).
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of Title VII continually assured the critics that the bill did not authorize anyone to impose a quota 45 and "that to hire a Negro solely
because he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a
'white only' employment policy." 46 In an interpretative memorandum prepared by the bill's floor managers, Senators Clark and Case,
it was additionally stated that an employer would not be required, or
even permitted, to prefer Negroes for future opportunities.4 7 Yet
even when it was recognized that quotas were not directly written
into the bill, it was charged that an employer would institute them in
any event, "in order to keep the weight of the Federal Government
48
off his neck."
As the debate continued, a bipartisan coalition prepared a
number of amendments to the Civil Rights Bill which became known
as the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute.4 9 This substitute, which eventually became law, contained a new section, 703(j), which codified
the congressional purpose "that title VII does not require an
employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by
giving preferential treatment to any individual or group. "50 The
45 Id. at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 1540 (remarks of Rep. Lindsay); id. at 1600
(remarks of Rep. Minish); id. at 2558 (remarks of Rep. Goodell); id. at 5094, 5423 (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6563, 6566 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 12617 (remarks of Sen.
Muskie).
4I Id. at 8921 (remarks of Sen. Williams). Responding to charges that blacks would be favored by the Act, Senator Williams queried "how can the language of equality favor one race or
one religion over another? Equality can have only one meaning, and that meaning is selfevident to reasonable men." Id.
47 Id. at 7213 (remarks of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case).
48 Id. at 8500 (remarks of Sen. Smathers); accord, id. at 8618-19 (remarks of Sen. Sparkman
and Sen. Keating); id. at 9034 (remarks of Sen. Tower and Sen. Stennis).
49 Cooper and Sobol, supra note 31, at 1610-11; Vass, supra note 31, at 445-46; Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1159.
50 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). It was added that section
703(j) "does not represent any change in the substance of the title. It does state clearly and
accurately what we have maintained all along about the bill's intent and meaning." Id. See Vass,
supra note 31, at 450. The exact wording of the section is as follows:
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing number or percentage
imbalance.
Nothing
contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by
any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified
by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or
other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State,
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anti-discrimination language of sections 703(a) and (d), upon which
51
Brian Weber would later rely, was nevertheless left unchanged.
Title VII opponents were also concerned with the'power that
would vest in the federal judiciary. 52 They were assured that a federal court would not be able to "order preferential hiring or promotion consideration for any particular race" 53 but would be "solely
limited to ordering an end to the discrimination which is in fact occurring." 54 Senators Clark and Case later stated that a court could
order "appropriate affirmative relief" 55 after a finding of discrimination, but not in favor of "anyone who was not discriminated against in
violation of this title." 56
It has been said that a major reason for the protracted debate on
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "the need for 'legislative history' . . .
to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law." 57 Regardless of whether Congress felt it had succeeded in providing that guidance, several legislators expressed apprehension that the Supreme
Court would not follow "a basis of law and precedent" 58 in deciding
civil rights issues but would instead rely on "personal predilec•tion[s]." 5 9 Despite any and all fears, on June 17, 1964, the Senate
passed the bill by a vote of 76 to 18.60 On July 2, 1964, the House
of Representatives voted 289 to 126 to accept the Senate amendments

section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State,
section, or other area.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
51 Cooper and Sobol, supra note 31, at 1608; Vass, supra note 31, at 448-50; Developments
in the Law, supra note 31, at 1159-60.
52 See 110 CONG. REc. 13078 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
53 Id. at 6563 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel). See id. at 9113 (remarks of Sen. Keating).
54 Id. at 6563 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
55 Id. at 7214 (remarks of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case).
56 Id. Senator Clark had also asked the Justice Department to prepare a memorandum to
rebut the criticisms of the Civil Rights Bill made by Senator Hill. Id. at 7206-07. That memo
stated:
There is no provision, either in title VII or in any other part of this bill, that
requires or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal court to require preferential
treatment for any individual or any group for the purpose of achieving racial balance.
Id. at 7207.
V United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2752 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Vass, supra note 31, at 444).
58 110 CONG. REc. 15873 (remarks of Rep. Wyman). See id. at 9029 (remarks of Sen. Tower
and Sen. Talmadge); id. at 15878 (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
59 Id. at 15873 (remarks of Rep. Wyman).
60 Id. at 15865 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). The Senate imposed cloture on debate by its
members for only the second time in history. Vass, supra note 31, at 446.
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and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the bill on the same day. 61
The Act went into effect one year later, on July 2, 1965.62
The seminal Supreme Court case involving Title VII was Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. 6 3 There Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a
unanimous Court, stated that Title VII evidences a congressional
purpose to "remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
64
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees."
In holding that an employer's requirement of a high school education or the passing of a standardized intelligence test as a condition of
employment was prohibited by Title VII, when neither was job related, the Court rejected the argument that the employer must have
discriminatory intent. 65 Because the tests were found to operate so
as to disqualify black applicants at a much greater rate than white
applicants, they could only be used if the employer was able to demonstrate that they were job related. 6 6 Although the Court held
61

Cooper and Sobol, supra note 31, at 1611; Vass, supra note 31, at 457. See 110 CONG.

REC. 15865 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
63 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

14 id. at 429-30. In Griggs, thirteen black employees of respondent instituted an action
under Title VII. id. at 426. The district court found that prior to the effective date of Title VII,
the company had openly assigned blacks to the lowest paying job classifications (the Labor
Department). Id. at 426-27.
After July 2, 1965, the company abandoned this obvious discriminatory practice, but instituted a requirement of a high school diploma for transfer out of the Labor Department into any
of the all-white departments. Id. at 427. For initial employment in any of these departments an
applicant had to achieve satisfactory scores on two professionally developed tests and also have
completed high school. Id. at 427-28.
65 Id. at 432. Chief Justice Burger stated that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
66 Id.
at 434-35. Reliance on the fact that the employer's requirements in Griggs disqualified blacks at a higher rate than whites was the beginning of the adverse impact analysis which
has subsequently played a large part in Title VII litigation. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). If an employee selection
procedure determines successful candidates "for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significandy different from that of the pool of applicants," the employer must justify the procedure on
the grounds of business necessity. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425. The
employer must then show that the test is significantly related to job performance. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 426; see Shoben, Probing the DiscriminatoryEffects of Employee
Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1, 5-9
(1977). In Griggs, there was some question as to whether the legislative history of Title VII
authorized the result. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 434 n.ll. Chief Justice Burger
noted the language in the interpretive memorandum of Senators Clark and Case which stated
that "[a]n employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes." id.; 110 CONG. REC. 7213
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case). The use of the word "qualifications" in that memo
and also in a later memorandum convinced Chief Justice Burger that what the Senators meant
was that employers could require that employees be fit for the actual job rather than being able
to set up any qualifications at all. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 434 n.ll; 110 CONG.
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that "the thrust of the Act [was] the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation," 6 7 Chief Justice Burger also
noted that "Id]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or
68
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."
Even though whites were not discriminated against in Griggs, this
language clearly indicated that all citizens are protected by Title
VII. 69
Five years later the Court directly confronted the issue of reverse discrimination for the first time. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.,70 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated
"that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white
petitioners in this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes." 71 The discrimination suffered by the white
petitioners in McDonald, however, was not part of any affirmative

REG. 7247 (remarks of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case). See Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504
F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
67 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis in original).
61 Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
69 The indication was apparently not clear enough. In Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975), a white job applicant instituted a Title VII action against
his union alleging that the union utilized a dual grading system on employment tests with the
aim of fulfilling a court ordered minority quota. Id. at 594. Plaintiff alleged that the test constituted discrimination per se because it had not been validated; i.e., shown to be job related. Id.
See generally, Shoben, supra note 66, at 19-23. The court, however,, held that since the plaintiff was not a member of a minority group he was not entitled to the protection of Title VII.
Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. at 597. In holding that "[t]he persons
protected under Title VII are those minority group members who have traditionally been the
targets of discrimination by labor unions," id., the court relied on the congressional purpose in
enacting Title VII as stated in Griggs. Id. The court did not draw a distinction between the
language of equality in Griggs, see note 68 supra and accompanying text, and its conclusion that
whites were not protected by Title VII. Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. at
597.
One possible basis for harmonizing the two decisions is that the quota in Mele had been
judicially authorized. Id. at 594. Therefore, even if the court had held the white plaintiff to be
protected by Title VII, "the Federal policy in favor of overcoming the effects of past discrimination by means of affirmative action" could have been declared paramount. Id. at 597.
70 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
71 Id. at 280. In McDonald, two white employees charged with stealing property from the
respondent were discharged from the respondent's employ while a black employee, similarly
charged, was not dismissed. Id. at 276. They brought suit pursuant to Title VII and also under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 275; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). Although Justices White and
Rehnquist could not agree that section 1981 was applicable, all of the Justices agreed that the
white employees had stated a valid cause of action under Title VII. 427 U.S. at 296.
Justice Marshall noted that recent EEOC decisions had interpreted Title VII as proscribing
racial discrimination against whites and stated that "[t]his conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to 'cover white men and
white women and all Americans.' " Id. at 280.
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action program, and Justice Marshall expressly declined to rule on
72
the validity of any form of such preferential treatment.
The problem of reverse discrimination in an affirmative action
context was faced two years later in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke. 73 There a divided Supreme Court issued two
holdings: first, the University could not utilize a quota system
whereby a certain number of seats in the medical school were reserved for minority applicants; 74 and second, the University could,
however, consider the applicant's race during the admission process. 75 The Bakke case was decided under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 76 and thus has no direct application to a Title VII action.
To a limited degree, however, the opinions did analyze prior Title
VII decisions. 77 Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the Court,
stated that federal courts have ordered race conscious remedies in
employment discrimination cases only after finding actual discrimination by the employer. 78 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun expressed the opposite view:

72 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 280-81 n.8. Justice Marshall
stressed the fact "'that we do not consider here the permissibility of such a program, whether
judicially required or otherwise prompted." Id. The Court's holding in McDonald was a major
area of contention during the oral argument in the Weber case. 47 U.S.L.W. 3645 (April 3,
1979). Counsel for Brian Weber argued that Justice Marshall's opinion in McDonald "establishes
the proposition that Title VII strikes down racial barriers to any group-whether majority or minority." Id. at 3647. Justice Marshall disputed the applicability of McDonald and read aloud the
passage where the Court declined to decide the validity of affirmative action. Id. The Justice
then inquired: "' Why do you think the Court threw that in? Dictum?' " Id.
73 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Bakke case involved a white male who had been denied admission to the medical school at the University of California at Davis for two consecutive years. Id.
at 276. He alleged reverse discrimination against the medical school's special admissions program under which sixteen of the one hundred available seats were reserved for members of
minority groups each year. Id. at 278-79. The medical school had never been adjudged guilty of
racial discrimination in their admission practices. Id. Rather, a major factor in the decision to
implement affirmative action was the desire to remedy societal discrimination. Id. at 306. For
an excellent discussion of the events leading up to Bakke and the Court's action in that case, see
H. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN To BAKKE, 253-306 (1979). See also Bakaly and Krischer, Bakke:
Its Impact on Public Employee Discrimination, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 471, 471-74 (1979).
74 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978).
75 Id. at 272.
76 Id. at 270.
77 Id. at 300-02, 308 n.44 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 340-42 n.17, 353-55, 363-69 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.).
78 Id. at 308-09 n.44 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell stated that "Title VII principles
support the proposition that findings of identified discrimination must precede the fashioning of
remedial measures embodying racial classification." Id. Also, that "we have never approved
preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at
302.
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Thus, our cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have held
that, in order to achieve minority participation in previously segregated areas of public life, Congress may require or authorize preferential treatment for those likely disadvantaged by societal racial
discrimination. Such legislation has been sustained even without a
requirement of findings of intentional racial discrimination by those
required or authorized to accord preferential treatment, or a caseby-case determination that those to be benefited suffered from ra79
cial discrimination.

When the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was faced with
theWeber case, 80 the Supreme Court had not yet decided Bakke.
Two of the circuit judges adopted reasoning similar to that which Justice Powell would later express in Bakke. The Fifth Circuit majority
stated that "[i]n the absence of prior discrimination a racial quota
loses its character as an equitable remedy and must be banned as an
unlawful racial preference prohibited by Title VII." 8 Additionally,
the Fifth Circuit felt that such affirmative action may be implemented
only in favor of those who are actual or potential victims of that discrimination. 82
The situations which pose little difficulty under Title VII are
those in which the discriminator and injured party are readily identifiable. 83 In such cases as Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,84
"[t]he beneficiaries receive[d] a preference not because they are
minorities, but because the employer [had] discriminated against
them." 8 5 In Franks, an employer who had denied individuals cer'9Id. at 366 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.).
The opinion contained language particularly appropriate to the situation that Weber would later present:
"[allthough Title V11 clearly does not require employers to take action to remedy the disadvantages imposed upon racial minorities by hands other than their own, such an objective is perfectly consistent with the remedial goals of the statute." Id. at 340-42 n.17.
80 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721
(1979).
"' Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
82 Id. at 224-25. On behalf of the court, Judge Gee stated that "[a] minority worker who has
been kept from his rightful place by discriminatory hiring practices may be entitled to preferential treatment 'not because he is Black, but because, and only to the extent that, he has been
discriminated against.' " Id. (quoting Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 999 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied 431 U.S. 965 (1977)).
This idea seems to have originated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
where Chief Justice Burger stated: "the Act does not command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group." Id. at 430-31. ,
83 Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1111.
- 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
85 Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 39 (1976); see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
751-52 (1976).
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tain positions was required not only to hire the petitioners but also to
give them full seniority. 86 While the form of the remedy may be
disputed, 8 7 all agreed that the individuals deserved some preference."" This "requirement of mutuality between wrongdoer and beneficiary" 8 9 is an essential part of the "rightful place" and "make
whole" theories of Title VII remedies. 90
It is not always possible, though, to compensate the precise victim of the discrimination. 91 It may be that a person who was denied
employment on racial grounds has moved away or has found other
employment. 9 2 Members of minority groups, knowing that an
employer follows discriminatory practices might refrain from applica93
tion in order to avoid the humiliation of almost certain rejection.
In such situations it has been held, after a finding of discrimination
on the part of the employer, that the remedy should be given to 94a
racial group, even if some of the members were not actual victims.
88 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 779-80. Franks was a class action in which
the petitioners alleged that the respondent had refused to employ them as over-the-road truck
drivers because of their race. Id. at 750-51. The fact that the employer had discriminated was
not contested; the only issue was whether retroactive seniority should be granted to unnamed
members of the class. Id. at 752.
87 The opinion of the Court granted full seniority to members of the petitioning class. Id. at
766-72. Justice Powell, in partial dissent, argued that the petitioners should not be given competitive seniority which "determines an employee's preferential rights to various economic advantages at the expense of other employees." Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
88 Id. at 786-87 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Powell was in
favor of granting benefit type seniority which he felt would work "complete equity." Id. at 787
(Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Benefit seniority would determine such
things as "pension rights, length of vacations, size of insurance coverage and unemployment
benefits," i.e., employee rights vis-a-vis the employer. Id. In this way the wrongdoer would be
penalized while the victim would be made whole. Id.
89 Brest, supra note 85, at 41.
90 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 763-64; Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-21; Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 220
(5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979); Morrow v. Crisler,
491 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); United States v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1972); Brest, supra note 82, at 38-39.
91 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972). See generally Brest, supra note 85, at 39-42; Givens, Manhart in the Light of Bakke, 4
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 330, 331-33 (1979).
92 See Brest, supra note 85, at 48-52.
93 Id. at 51-52; see United States v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 38, 428
F.2d 144, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
94 See EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 1979); EEOC v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 175 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978);
EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1976); Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493
F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Since Kaiser had never been found guilty of actual discrimination, the black employees at the Gramercy plant were in their rightful place within the Kaiser employment structure. 95 The issue thus
became the permissibility of a voluntary affirmative action program to
remedy societal discrimination. 96 On behalf of five members of the
97
Court, Justice Brennan declared that such action was permissible.
The majority opinion began by emphasizing the narrowness of its
inquiry. 98 Since there was no state action present in the KaiserSteelworkers program, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment was not involved. 99 The voluntary nature of the program removed the issue of a court's power to remedy Title VII violations, leaving only the "narrow statutory issue of whether Title VII
forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon
bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the
00
manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan."'
The conclusion that such plans were not forbidden rested on
three basic grounds. First, Weber's reliance on a "literal construction" of Title VII, although "not without force," was inconsistent with
the essential spirit of Title VII.101 In what will probably become the
95 Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 224; see Watkins v. United
Steel Workers of America, Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 46 (5th Cir. 1975).
96 47 U.S.L.W. 3284 (Oct. 24, 1978). Throughout the entire history of the case, no party
mentioned the case of Barnett v. International Harvester, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
Tenn. 1976), the facts of which were almost identical to Weber. There the district
that an apprenticeship program, designed to eliminate historic discrimination in
trades, did not violate section 703(j) of Title VII over the objection of a white who
higher on the admittance test than any black who was admitted. Id. at 789-90.
9' United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979).
98 Id. at 2726.
99 Id.
100 Id.

786 (W.D.
court held
the skilled
had scored

(emphasis in original).

101 Id. at 2726-27. Justice Brennan indicated that although a situation may seem to fit within

the four corners of a statute, it should not be so viewed if it would not further the intent of the
statute. Id. In support of this proposition, Justice Brennan cited Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In that case, the Supreme Court was faced with a federal statute
which made it a crime for anyone to advance transportation costs to an alien pursuant to a
contract whereby the new immigrant would then perform services for the person who paid the
costs. Id. at 458. A church in New York City had hired a pastor who was then residing in
England. Id. at 457-58. As part of the contract, the church was to pay the new pastor's passage
to New York. Id. The Court held that the statute could not be applied to this situation. Id. at
472. In so doing, the Court noted that the obvious aim of the statute was to prevent employers
from importing "great numbers of an ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers," which
would "reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant." Id. at 463-64.
Although it can of course be contended that Title VII was debated much more carefully
than the statute involved in Holy Trinity Church, it has been shown that those debates may not
be entitled to controlling weight and therefore should not be allowed to overcome the spirit of
Title VII. See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text. See also note 142 infra and accompanying text.
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most frequently quoted passage in the decision, Justice Brennan identified the apparent conflict between the letter and spirit of the Act,
stating that
[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had "been excluded from the American dream for so
long" constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary;
private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 102
The second basis for the Court's decision depends on a construction of section 703(j) of the Act which provides that an employer shall
not be required to grant preferential racial treatment.103 Because of
the difference between a mandatory practice and a prohibited one,
the Court concluded that "[t]he natural inference is that Congress
104
chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action."
Finally, the Court's approval of the Kaiser-USWA agreement
rested on their observation that critical support in both Houses of
Congress for Title VII had been provided by legislators "who traditionally resisted federal regulation of private business." 105 These
legislators had sought maximum preservation of " 'management prerogatives and union freedoms.' "106 From this, the Court inferred
legislative intent to provide a sphere in which the private sector
could remedy the problems caused by discrimination. 0 7

102 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. at 2728 (citation omitted). It has been held that
the preferred means of fulfilling the goals of the Act is voluntary compliance by employers and
unions. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1977).
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). See note 50 supra and accompanying text. Justice Brennan
stated that the section was added to Title VII to prevent unwarranted government intervention
into private enterprise, not to prevent employers themselves from undertaking race conscious
action. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. at 2729.
104 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. at 2729. The majority noted that "[t]he section
does not state that 'nothing in Title VII shall be interpreted to permit' voluntary affirmative
efforts to correct racial imbalances." Id. (emphasis in original).
105 Id. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
106 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. at 2729 (quoting H:.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 29.
107 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct., at 2729. The court then faced Weber's contention that proponents of Title VII had anticipated the situation where an employer would -utilize
racial criteria. Id. at 2729-30 n.7. The majority drew a distinction between maintaining a racially balanced workforce and achieving one. Id. The former practice would violate Title VII,
but the latter would not because, when an employer institutes voluntary affirmative action to
achieve a racial balance, the employer is responding to "manifest racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." Id.; see United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l
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Justice Brennan did not attempt to define the permissible scope
of an affirmative action plan. 10 8 For several reasons, however, the
Kaiser-USWA agreement was acceptable. First, in opening opportunities for blacks it was in harmony with the purposes of Title
VII. 10 9 Second, because it did not require the discharge of white
workers and did not flatly prohibit their advancement, their interests
were not "unnecessarily trammel[led]." 110 Finally, the agreement
was temporary and did not attempt to maintain a permanent racial
balance."'
Justice Blackmun joined the majority opinion and also filed a brief
concurrence. 112 Sharing, to a degree, the dissenters' concern that
the majority opinion conflicted with the plain language of the statute,
Justice Blackmun stated that he would have preferred a narrower
basis for the decision. 113 That basis, the "arguable violation" theory,
is closely akin to the position taken by Judge Wisdom in his Fifth
Circuit dissent. 1 14 In essence, the theory is that employers and
unions may adopt affirmative action plans when, under the
circumstances, they could reasonably be concerned about Title VII
liability and where the plan itself is a reasonable response to the
circumstances causing that concern." 5 Justice Blackmun's anxiety at
the reach of the majority's reasoning, however, was eased by his
analysis of the two principal ways in which it deviated from the arguUnion Local 461, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1973). Unless, however, there is a large influx of
black craftsmen to the Gramercy area, the end of the quota will be the beginning of a decline in
the black representation in the skilled workforce. See note 19 supra.
108 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2730.
109 Id.
110 Id. See Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1977); see notes 164-65 infra and accompanying text.
"I United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2730. Aside from the question whether a
program structured to endure for thirty years can legitimately be classified as temporary, there
appears to be an inherent inconsistency between the temporary nature of a program and the
extent to which it retards the advancement of white employees. The shorter the life of a program the more it would trammel the interests of white employees since a higher percentage of
minorities would have to be trained to reach the desired goal. The longer the duration of the
program the more it appears that the temporary nature of the program is only formal. It is thus
suggested that while the temporary nature of a program must be taken into account in that it
must stop once the desired goal is reached, see note 107 supra, the white participation in the
training program was the more decisive factor in determining its permissibility.
112 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2730-31 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 2732 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 2731-34 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 563 F.2d at 227-39 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Judge Wisdom had stated that Kaiser and
the USWA were walking a "high tightrope without a net beneath them." Id. at 230 (Wisdom,
J., dissenting).
115 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 231-34 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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able violation theory. 1 16 His discussion of these points somewhat illuminates the majority's holding.
First, Justice Blackmun observed that the majority's approach
would permit affirmative action simply because of a statistical disparity. 1 7 Since Title VII liability cannot always be based on such a
disparity alone, Justice Blackmun believed that reliance on statistics
in evaluating the permissibility of affirmative action will avoid severe
practical problems; employers will not be forced to choose between
Title VII liability and possible reverse discrimination, 1 18 and courts
need not determine new statistical guidelines for reverse discrimination actions. 119
Second, Justice Blackmun noted that the majority opinion permits affirmative action to remedy the effects of discrimination which
Title VII could not itself reach.12 0 For example, the creation of a
"traditionally segregated job category" may have predated the Act. 121
Additionally, Justice Blackmun observed that the majority approach
allows the use of affirmative action to increase the number of
minorities in jobs where their near absence might not constitute a
prima facie case because societal discrimination had limited the
number of available skilled minorities in the labor force. 122 These
116 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2732--34 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Id. at 2732-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 2733. The employer is permitted to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating
that there is a legitimate business reason for the statistical disparity in his workforce. See note
66 supra and accompanying text; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 339-40 n.20 (1977).
119 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun thought that an arguable violation of Title VII did not amount to a prima facie violation. Id. If the arguable violation standard were adopted, the employer could then identify it
and not create liability to minority employees. Id. This would "avoid hair-splitting litigation."
Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-55 (1977). As
long as the employer's seniority system is bona fide, any pre-Act discrimination is not covered
by Title VII. Id. at 352.
122 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). justice
Blackmun indicated that the minority employees at the Gramercy plant, had they been a party
to the case, would probably have been unable to prove a prima facie Title VII violation. Id. The
relevant statistics would have been the number of black craftsmen in the area compared with
the racial makeup of craftsmen in Kaiser's Gramercy plant. See Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1977). Kaiser's unsuccessful attempts to recruit black
craftsmen prior to the 1974 agreement indicate that the first statistic would have been too low
to establish prima facie liability. See note 16 supra. The majority opinion had stated that the
"exclusion [of minorities] from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice." United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2725 n. 1;
see also Local 35, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. City of Hartford, 462 F. Supp. 1271,
1277-78 & n.10 (D.Conn. 1978) ("generalized findings of past discrimination rather than ...
117
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expansions on the "arguable violation" theory were, in his opinion,
justified on equitable grounds. 2 3 Because he also felt that the dissenters had overvalued Title VII's legislative history, 12 4 Justice
Blackmun overcame his concern with the statutory language and
12 5
joined the five justice majority.
Chief Justice Burger, although not completely opposed to the
result that the Court reached, 126 dissented because he felt the Court
violated "the explicit language of the statute and . . . long-established
principles of separation of powers." 127 Stating that judicial interpretation should only be resorted to where the statute involved is ambiguous, 128 Chief Justice Burger believed that it was unnecessary to
construe the legislative history of Title VII because the plain language
of the statute would void the Kaiser-USWA agreement.1 29 While his
inclination would be to support the majority's result if he were a
member of Congress amending Title VII, l3 0 Chief Justice Burger argued that the majority decision exceeded the bounds of judicial authority. 131

specific findings as to each and every union and contractor affected by the program" warrants
broad affirmative action relief). Id.
123 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 2733-34. Justice Blackmun noted that Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
Court in Griggs, had declined to literally interpret certain statements made by Title VII proponents. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2733-34 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See note 66 supra.
125 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2731 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 2734 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127 Id.
128

Id.

129

Id.

130 Id. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger admitted that it can be contended that "Congress may not have gone far enough in correcting the effects of past discrimination when it enacted Title VII," and if there were to be any changes in policy "it is for
Congress, not this Court, to so direct." Id. Justice Blackmun had taken exactly the opposite
view in his concurring opinion when he stated "if the Court has misperceived the political will,
it has the assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if
it so chooses." Id. at 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Congress has recently seen fit to amend the Civil Rights Acts to reject the Supreme Court
decisions in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136 (1977). Those decisions had held that an employer did not have to include pregnancy disabilities in his disability plan, and that sick leave benefits could be denied to pregnant
employees. General Elec. Co. y. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46; Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. at 145. See 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)). This recent
legislation disapproves those cases and clarifies the "original intent to include pregnancy-based
discrimination in its prohibition of sex discrimination in employment." Somers v. Aldine Independent School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900, 902 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
1s United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, also dissented. 132
After an intemperate introduction in which he accused the majority of
sharply altering prior Court interpretation of Title VII, 1 3 3 Justice
Rehnquist conducted an exhaustive study of the legislative history of
Title VII and concluded that the drafters of Title VII had anticipated
the instant situation and had intended that reverse discrimination be
prohibited. 134 Stating that the Kaiser-USWA plan was not as voluntary as the majority might have thought, 13 5 Justice Rehnquist be'
lieved that Kaiser, in "[b]owing to that [government] pressure 136
created the situation that Title VII opponents feared most. 137 Because he believed that one reason for the lengthy debate over Title
VII was to furnish precise legislative history " 'to guide the courts in
interpreting and applying the law,' "138 Justice Rehnquist was "led
inescapably to the conclusion that Congress fully understood what it
13 9
was saying and meant precisely what it said."
It is not altogether clear, though, that Congress anticipated voluntary affirmative action during the spring of 1964. An overwhelming
majority of the passages cited by Justice Rehnquist occurred in the
context of debate over forced quotas. 14 0 Voluntary programs of the
Kaiser-USWA variety may well have been "the 'farthest thing' from

132

Id. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

133

Id.

Id. at 2741-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2737 n.2 & 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that "Kaiser
and the Steelworkers acted under pressure from an agency of the Federal Government,
which found that minorities were being 'underutilized' at Kaiser's plants." Id. at 2749
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because of the result the majority reached concerning the meaning
of Title VII, it was unnecessary for Justice Brennan to discuss the relationship of Executive
Order Number 11,246 (reprinted following 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2730 n.9. Justice Rehnquist, while he described the action of the court
below concerning Executive Order Number 11,246, saw fit not to discuss any conflict it may
have had with his view of Title VII in his dissent. 99 S. Ct. at 2739 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The relationship of the Executive Order to aflirmative action is discussed in notes 145-55
infra and accompanying text. See also notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
136 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137 Id. See notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text.
138 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting Vass,
supra note 28, at 444).
139 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
110 CONG. REc. at 1148 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (context of "permit[ting] the Government to control the internal affairs of employers or labor unions"); at 1518 (remarks of Rep.
Celler) (context of the powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
federal judiciary); id. at 1540 (remarks of Rep. Lindsay) ("force acceptance"); id. at 1600 (remarks of Rep. Minish) ("no one will be forced to hire . . ."); id. at 4764 (remarks of Sen. Ervin
& Sen. Hill)(employer being compelled by Commission).
134
135
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the legislators' minds at that time." 141 If this is true, the spirit of
the Act should assume an important posture in Title VII construction,
142
for at least the spirit of the act can be accurately identified.
United Steelworkers v. Weber,143 while a firm endorsement of
affirmative action, will not, of course, be the final word in this area.
The permissible extent of voluntary affirmative action programs and
the statistical situations in which they may be implemented, remain
to be clarified.'"4 The decision also fails to dispel concern as to the
45
difference between a voluntary program and a required one.'
Even though the Kaiser-USWA agreement was not judicially imposed
under the remedial provisions of Title VII, it was involuntary in the
sense that Kaiser feared the loss of its government contracts. 146 The
decision of the Supreme Court to avoid consideration of Executive
Order No. 11,246 leaves open the possible argument that the Executive Order and Title VII are inconsistent. 147 If the threshold violation level of Executive Order No. 11,246 is substantially lower than
the level of a Title VII violation, employers could be forced into remedial action to overcome the effects of societal discrimination, even
when their actions do not amount to a prima facie violation of Title
VII.1's This would destroy much of the management-union freedom
that the Court found to be a primary concern of the eighty-eighth
Congress. 149 To accept this result simply because Title VII itself is
not imposing the remedy is to beg the question. The language of the
regulations promulgated under Executive Order No. 11,246, requir-

141 47 U.S.L.W. 3646 (April 3, 1979). This position was taken by the Government at oral
argument. Id.
542 110 CoNe. REC. 6547-48 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). "'An antidiscrimination law
cannot be evaluated simply by an examination of its provisions, 'for the letter killeth, but the
spirit giveth life.' " Id. at 7214 (remarks of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case).
143 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
'" United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
145

See generally, Mass & Biles, Weber: A Practitioner'sDilemma-Walking the EEO "Tight-

rope Without a Net," 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 39, 44-49 (1979).
146Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 226. The court of appeals noted
the district court's findings "that the 1974 collective bargaining agreement reflected less of a
desire on Kaiser's part to train black craft workers than a self-interest in satisfying the OFCC in
order to retain lucrative government contracts." Id. The Executive Order requires all government contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or
national origin." Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1) (reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 20 00e (1976)). See
notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
147See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1299-1304.
148 Id; see Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171-74 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1972).

141See notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text.
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ing affirmative action wherever underutilization of a certain racial
group exists, should be equated with a prima facie violation of Title
VII. 150 A prima facie violation should be present if there is "manifest
racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." 151 In
this way, "underutilization" will not depend solely upon the racial
composition of the surrounding work place and the employer will be
52
able to refute the argument that he may have violated Title VII.1
It can, of course, be contended that an employer would institute
remedial action at the first mention of an arguable violation rather
than assume the heavy burden of rebuttal. 153 Even if this were true,
management-union freedom will not suffer extensively as long as it is
clearly understood that underutilization means "manifest racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." 154 In this manner,
an affirmative action program can be easily justified because the focus
will not be on societal discrimination itself but rather on its effects on
the community work force and the particular employer's job groups. 155
Scholars will undoubtedly debate, for some time to come, the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the majority and dissenting opinions in United Steelworkers v. Weber. 156 The inquiry will assuredly
be centered on the legislative history of Title VII, and the respective
157
merits of Justice Brennan's and Justice Rehnquist's interpretations.
While the two Justices came to opposite conclusions, it is possible
that they were both correct in their judgment, but with regard to
different areas. Justice Brennan's interpretation weighs the value of
minority group interests-the need of black Americans to finally take
significant steps toward the achievement of equal employment oppor150 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b) (1978). Compare Contractor's Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d at 172 ("Section 703(j) is a limitation upon Title VII . . .") with United States v.
Trucking Management, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 342, 346 (D.D.C. 1979) (a seniority
system lawful under Title VII cannot be declared unlawful under Executive Order Number
11,246). The logical extension of the idea expressed in Trucking Management is its application
to a government contractor who resists the pressure to implement voluntary affirmative action
and is threatened with the loss of his government contracts.
151 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2729-30 n.7. See note 66 supra.
152 It is difficult to see how Kaiser could validly have been found to be underutilizing minority craftsmen when it had made extensive but unsuccessful attempts to locate them. See note 19
supra. It has already been demonstrated that Kaiser would probably have been able to prevail
had minority unskilled workers at the Gramercy plant instituted a Title VII action. See note 122
supra.
153 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
154 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. at 2729-30 n.7.
15 See id. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Brest, supra note 85, at 42 ("racial discrimination is hardly the only injury that our society has inflicted on its members").
156 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
157 Address by Alfred W. Blumrosen, Analyzing Supreme Court Decision in Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum, [reprinted in] Daily Labor Rep. F-i (July 2, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen].
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tunity. 1 58 Justice Rehnquist focuses on the interests of the
individual-Brian Weber's right to have his position considered as
sympathetically as every other individual and to demand that
employers not distribute benefits on the basis of the accident of
race. 159 Past Supreme Court decisions have recognized and provided
remedies for both of these interests. 16 0 The difficulty arises when
individual and group rights demand inconsistent results in a single
case. Which interest should be paramount?
The origin of both the individual and group interests in this case
dictate that the latter was rightly preferred. It must be remembered
that prior to the 1974 agreement between Kaiser and the Union, the
unskilled employees, white and black, had no opportunity whatsoever
to receive craft training. 16 1 The Kaiser-USWA plan was created
solely to ease the plight of minority employees. 162 The white participation in the program existed solely because of these efforts to
satisfy minority group interests.1 6 3 But for the plight of the minority
employees the training program never would have existed. Brian
Weber's claim is thus reduced to a demand that the group interest
continues to remain unsatisfied while his interest goes first.
Viewed in this light, the Kaiser-USWA plan is acceptable. The
group interest was legitimate and, in distributing the needed benefits, individual interests were adequately considered and compensated. 164 Reverse discrimination, though, is by no means a dead is158 Id. at F-1, F-2.
159 Id. For a general discussion of individual and group interests, see Venick & Lane, Doubling the Price of Past Discrimination:The Employer's Burden After McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 8 Loy. U.L.J. 789, 790-812 (1977).
160 Blumrosen, supra note 157, at F-2, F-3. The differing interests are best illustrated by
these statements: "It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide
an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race .... " Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. at 579 (emphasis in original) and: It is the objective of Title VII to "remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 429-30.
561 It will be remembered that Kaiser, prior to the 1974 agreement, provided craft training
only to those workers who had some training already, and before that, hired their skilled
workers off the street. See note 3 supra.
162 Even though it was found that Kaiser feared the loss of its government contracts, see note
146 supra, there would have been no government pressure if black workers were not in such a
depressed state.
163 Blumrosen, supra note 157, at F-4.
164 Id. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227-39 (1978). In Weber the
effect of the "reverse discrimination" was that whites received something they did not have
before. See note 160 supra. Other forms of affirmative action, such as hiring quotas, deflect
employment opportunities from nonminority persons. In response to situations of this type,
there has been developed a test which states that reverse discrimination can be acceptable if its

effects are not "concentrated upon a small ascertainable group of non-minority persons." Local
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sue. When individual rights are the sole issue in a case, there seems
to be no reason why the principle of color blindness should not apply.165 Voluntary affirmative action should not be haphazardly implemented by an employer who seeks to insulate himself from liability. Rather, careful and intelligent evaluation of the effects of societal
discrimination should determine whether minority group interests do
exist and, if they do, the intensity of the resulting preference.
Steven Backfisch

Union 35, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Hartford, 462 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D.Conn.
1978); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 F. Supp. 496, 506 (D.Conn. 1978).
165 See Butta v. Anne Arundel County, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 24 (D.Md. 1979)(mere
preference for a black person for a position on the county human relations board is not justification for choosing a black applicant over a more qualified white); see also Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 579 (employment decisions should be made "without regard to whether
members of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work force"). Id.

